Power plays and military gains: What’s next for Sudan?

By Rabia Ali

ISTANBUL (AA) – Nearly two years into Sudan’s brutal war, the conflict continues to unfold, with the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) making advances into the capital Khartoum while the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) push for the formation of a parallel government.

Since the war between the SAF and RSF erupted in April 2023, thousands have been killed and more than 12 million people have been displaced. As the humanitarian crisis worsens, questions arise over Sudan’s future and the possibility of peace.

Recent developments, including the RSF’s attempt to establish a parallel government, have sparked mixed reactions from observers.

While the Sudanese army has made significant territorial gains, raising hopes of an end to the fighting, fears are also growing that the country could face further fragmentation as the RSF seeks to consolidate its political influence.

- RSF’s parallel government gambit

On Feb. 22, the RSF and its allied armed groups signed a “political charter” in Kenya, declaring their intent to form a government separate from the Sudanese authorities.

The RSF move, according to Sudanese analyst Jihad Mashamoun, comes as a reaction to its recent territorial losses and international sanctions against its leader, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, also known as Hemedti.

“The RSF has been losing credibility since the conflict began, especially in the eyes of the international community, due to the genocide and crimes they have committed in Sudan,” Mashamoun told Anadolu.

He explained that the RSF’s primary motive behind trying to form a parallel government is the “need for recognition and legitimacy.”

Mashamoun likened the situation to Libya, where rival military commander Khalifa Haftar has effectively divided the country into two factions – one under his control in the east and the other under the UN-recognized government in the west.

Hemedti, he added, wants to follow in Haftar’s footsteps in Sudan.

The analyst also warned that the formation of a parallel government could have wider regional consequences.

One particular concern is that the Arab tribes that migrate between the Sahel could rebel against the Chadian government, led by President Mahamat Idriss Deby, that “comes from a dominantly African tribe,” he said.

“Mahamat is concerned that if the RSF secures a victory in Sudan, they will turn against him and Chad,” said Mashamoun.

He also suggested that a parallel government could impact illegal immigration routes into Europe, which the RSF could use as leverage to pressure European nations into recognizing its authority.

There is also a possibility that these developments might lead to the involvement of external powers in supporting Hemedti, further complicating the conflict, Mashamoun added.

- SAF’s gains and upper hand

The Sudanese army has made significant gains in past weeks, recently capturing the strategic city of El-Obeid, ending a two-year RSF siege, and making advances in the capital Khartoum.

“This war started as a power struggle for Khartoum, and Khartoum remains the war’s single biggest prize,” Alan Boswell, Horn of Africa project director at the International Crisis Group, told Anadolu.

“If the Sudanese army retakes full control over Khartoum, it will have achieved its primary military objective. We would then likely see fighting displaced to other areas of Sudan, including Darfur and Kordofan.”

Mashamoun also emphasized that recapturing Khartoum would be a symbolic and strategic victory, sending the message that “the state survived the RSF’s onslaught” and attempt to dismantle Sudan’s governance structures.

The Sudanese army has been making steady progress since September, he said, and also offering amnesty to former RSF officers and soldiers who choose to switch sides, further weakening the paramilitary force.

With the SAF nearing complete control of Khartoum, the focus is now shifting to Darfur, where government forces and allied armed groups are mobilizing to push the RSF out of the region, he said.

In Darfur, the SAF is progressing steadily and focusing on “a new political reality,” Mashamoun, also a researcher on Horn of Africa, explained.

As things progress, the RSF, which has already suffered a loss of legitimacy, would want to negotiate with Sudan’s Sovereign Council leader and army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, he added.

- Will the fighting end soon?

Experts remain cautious about whether the latest developments signal an imminent end to the conflict.

“Given the high stakes, we worry that the conflict will escalate further before it de-escalates as outside countries vie for influence over Sudan’s endgame,” said Boswell.

Mashamoun echoed similar concerns, stating that in battlefield terms, “nothing is certain.”

On the political side, while Burhan might be open to an agreement with the RSF, he could face pushback from his generals, the Sudanese analyst said.

“Some believe the war will end soon, but how do we know that the RSF won’t get more tribesmen from the rest of the Sahel or mercenaries from foreign countries?” he said.

“One way for this to end is that the RSF is to be designated as a terrorist organization. That will stop the funding and takes away its legitimacy,” he said, adding that this would also deter foreign support for the group.

However, Mashamoun noted that the US and its allies have been reluctant to take such action, with former President Joe Biden only imposing sanctions on Hemedti and Burhan shortly before leaving office.

According to Boswell, there is almost no chance of mediation while the Sudanese army maintains its current military momentum.

“Once the dust settles, endgame discussions will likely revolve around Egypt, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia, the regional countries with the most sway in the Sudan war,” he said.

Mashamoun stressed that the international community’s current approach of treating both sides as equal partners has failed.

In his view, whoever wins the war will face a new political battle against Sudan’s civilian population, which will eventually demand democracy and accountability for war crimes committed during the conflict.